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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
in the Matter of #2A-6/26/8< 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY METRO BUS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
:^an&- ________ CASE NO. U—7-31-4-
ROBERT J. SMITH. 
Charging Party. 
ROBERT J. SMITH. p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Robert J. 
Smith to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
against his employer, Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority Metro Bus. Inc. The charge complains of a violation 
of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law but the Director found that 
it alleges no facts which would support a finding of 
interference, restraint or coercion. Smith was given two 
opportunities to amend his charge to allege facts which 
constitute a violation of the Taylor Law but he did not do so. 
It appears from the charge that Smith, a bus operator, 
challenges the promotion of another bus operator to a 
supervisory position and that operator's subsequent return to 
his former job. Smith also complains that the employer's 
contract with the union should, but does not, set standards 
for the above stated conduct. 
Board - U-7314 -2 
We affirm the decision of the Director that these 
allegations do not set forth a violation of the Taylor Law. 
r NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 26, 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
DaVid C. Randies. Membe^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-6/26/84 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC. 
-—- —-—---— Re spond eiit, _.-_ „. •.. • -_ ^ -. .____: „___ 
-and- CASE NO. U-7449 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7482 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS C. BARRY. p_rp_ se 
INTERIM DECISION 
These matters come to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry to decisions of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
charges, both of which allege that the United University 
Professions, Inc. (UUP) violated the Taylor Law by using part 
of his agency shop fee payments in the support of activities 
of a political nature. The Director noted that the section of 
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the Taylor Law which allows for the agency fee has not been 
found illegal by any court and the Board has previously 
approved the UUP's refund procedure which allows it to use 
agency shop fee monies in support of political objectives so 
long~"as~ ah o&jecrting employee ' ^ m ^ — 
thereafter. Thus, without serving a copy of either charge on 
UUP. the Director dismissed them on the ground that they do 
not set forth a violation of the Taylor Law. We have 
consolidated these cases for decision. 
Barry argues that it is illegal for UUP to use his money 
for a political purpose even temporarily. We rejected this 
proposition in 1978 when, in UUP (Eson). 11 PERB ir3074 (1981). 
we found that UUP's procedure of collecting agency shop fees 
during the course of its fiscal year and refunding to 
objecting employees their pro rata share of expenditures in 
support of political and ideological causes at the end of the 
year, satisfied §208.3 of the Taylor Law.— The decision of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway. 
Airline and Steamship Clerks. US . 17 PERB T7511 
(1984), raises the question whether our 1978 UUP (Eson) 
decision, is still appropriate. 
I/This precedent has been applied consistently in 
several cases, the most recent being UUP (Barry). 17 PERB 
1f3008 (1984). 
011' 
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Section 208.3 of the Taylor Law sanctions a wage or 
salary deduction of agency shop fees on behalf of employee 
organizations otherwise entitled to them which have: 
established and maintained a procedure providing 
for the refund to any employee demanding the 
r e tu r-n—a ny—par-t-of an-^agency—shop—£-ee—deauctton-
which represents the employee's pro rata share 
of expenditures by the organization in aid of 
activities or causes of a political or 
ideological nature only incidentally related to 
terms and conditions of employment. 
Relying in part upon the memorandum submitted in support of 
2/ the bill which became §208.3 by its sponsor.— we found that: 
the refund requirement was intended to limit the 
agency shop fee provision to the extent 
necessary to satify the prerequisite for 
constitutionality announced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 
431 US 209 (1977).37 
We then interpreted §208.3 and the Abood decision on which it 
was based as sanctioning the UUP refund procedure. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has now expanded upon its Abood 
opinion in Ellis. In it, the Supreme Court dealt with a 
^./Memorandum of Senator John E. Flynn, reported in New 
York State Legislative Annual - 1977 at p. 225. The 
memorandum stated at p. 226: 
In accord with the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in the Abood case, there is provision that only 
those unions that have established an 
appropriate rebate procedure will be entitled 
to an agency shop fee deduction. 
I/UUP (Eson) , 11 PERB 1f3068. at p. 3106 (1978). 
^ . 
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question similar to the one before us, arising under the 
Railway Labor Act. That statute is silent on all relevant 
matters, but the Court read into it the proposition that a 
union may not use agency shop fees even temporarily in support 
of i-ts politicalor ideological activities. Moreover, it^may 
have done so in order to preserve the constitutionality of 
agency shop fee payments under that statute. The following 
quotations from the Ellis decision are relevant: 
"[T]he Act does not authorize a union to spend 
an objecting employee's money to support 
political causes." 
"[T]here is language in this Court's cases 
to support the validity of a rebate 
program . . . . On the other hand, we 
suggested a more precise advance reduction 
scheme . . . . [N]ow we hold that the pure 
rebate approach is inadequate . . . ." 
(emphasis supplied) 
"The only justification for this union 
borrowing would be administrative 
convenience. But there are readily available 
alternatives, such as advance reduction of 
dues and/or interest-bearing escrow accounts, 
that place only the slightest additional 
burden, if any, on the union. Given the 
existence of acceptable alternatives, the 
union cannot be allowed to commit dissenters' 
funds to improper uses even temporarily." 
(emphasis supplied) 
In the light of this language, we now question the correct-
ness of our interpretation of §208.3 of the Taylor Law as 
sanctioning UUP's refund procedure. If it is not correct, we 
question what alternative procedures would satisfy the statute, 
and what should be done about UUP's current agency shop fee 
9121! 
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procedure. We therefore invite Barry and UUP to submit 
memoranda of law concerning these questions. Such memoranda 
should be submitted not later than July 20, 1984. Reply 
memoranda may be filed not later than August 10. 1984. 
DATED: June 26, 1984 
Albany, New York 
¥/(Lw£*& /C A&m 
Harold R.'Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies. Membe 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2C-6/26/84 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6788 
ALBANY POLICE OFFICERS UNION. 
LOCAL 2841. NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION. 
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES. 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
VINCENT J. Mc ARDLE, JR., Corporation Counsel 
(W. DENNIS DUGGAN. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROWLEY. FORREST and O'DONNELL, P.C. (RICHARD R. 
ROWLEY. ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Albany Police Officers 
Union. Local 2841, New York State Inspection. Security and Law 
Enforcement Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Local 2841). It complains about statements made by 
responsible spokesmen for the City of Albany (City), from April 
7. 1983 through April 29, 1983. It alleges that these 
statements violated §209-a.l (a), (b) and (d) of the Taylor Law 
in that they constituted threats to lay off employees if a 
tentative collective bargaining agreement were not ratified and 
an arbitrator were to award a salary increase which exceeded 
that provided in the tentative agreement. 
The City had negotiated with Local 2841 on behalf of two 
units of policemen for an agreement to succeed one that 
Board - U-6788 -2 
expired on December 31, 1982. The union petitioned for 
arbitration on February 4, 1983. Nevertheless, negotiations 
continued and tentative agreements were reached on April 7. 
1983. Those agreements were rejected by the union members at a 
ratification vote held on April 28. 1983. 
On April 7, McCormack, the commanding officer of the 
administrative services bureau of the police department and a 
member of the City's negotiating team, told Renna and other 
unit employees that he thought that the City's salary offer was 
reasonable and that there might be layoffs if Local 2841 
succeeded in obtaining a greater increase. Several days later 
McCormack told a larger group of unit employees that an 
excessive increase might lead to layoffs. On both occasions 
McCormack told the unit employees that a study conducted by the 
City indicated that the police force was overstaffed by 50 to 
70 employees and he showed them a roster which underlined the 
names of the 50 employees with least seniortiy. 
Our review of the record shows that it was not unusual for 
McCormack to join in ongoing conversations with unit employees, 
that neither conversation was initiated by McCormack, and that 
McCormack's demeanor was "cordial" and "friendly" throughout 
the discussions. The record does not indicate that unit 
employees had reason to feel under a compulsion to remain; 
instead, those who were present chose to attend and listen. 
9124 
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Unrelated to McCormack's statements, the Common Council 
president and the Corporation Counsel responded to reporters' 
questions on April 25, 28 and 29, and told them of the 
possibility of layoffs should an arbitrator award more than the 
City's last offer. 
The record establishes that the City was not in a deficit 
situation during the course of the negotiations and that 
layoffs had not been discussed at the weekly meetings of the 
City's leadership dealing with its operations. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 2841 to 
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the 
City's conduct did not violate the Taylor Law. The ALJ 
distinguished between a threat of retaliation because either a 
union or covered employees exercises protected rights and a 
statement that there might be layoffs if the exercise of 
protected rights results in cost increases for the employer. 
This is a subtle distinction but we conclude that it is a sound 
1/ one.— 
The statements of the City's representatives would be 
improper only if they were intended or likely to coerce 
employees into relinquishing rights guaranteed by the Taylor 
I/Accord: City of Easton. 9 PERB 1f9l09, at pp. 228 
and 229. (Pa. Labor Relations Bd.. 1979). See also State 
of New York. 12 PERB 1P009 (1979); City of Mount Vernon. 12 
PERB 1f3108 (1979); County of Nassau. 16 PERB 1f3006 (1983). 
-S-/C1 
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Law, such as the right of the union's membership to decide 
whether or not to accept or reject a negotiated agreement or 
the right to take the dispute to arbitration. The City's 
representatives are entitled, however, to express opinions 
regarding the merits of the agreement and its potential 
economic consequences so long as they do not do so in a 
coercive manner nor subvert the authority of the Local's 
2/ 
negotiators.— 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law of the ALJ. At worst, 
McCormack's participation may have been indiscreet, but we do 
not find that his comments were made in a threatening manner 
or that they were intended to or were likely to coerce the 
unit employees into ratifying the agreement or rejecting 
arbitration. 
The record also affords no basis for concluding that the 
statements of the president of the City Council and the 
Corporation Counsel were intimidating or designed to be so. 
The fact that the City was not running a deficit is not in 
itself sufficient evidence that its spokesmen lacked good 
faith when they conjectured about layoffs. The mere 
availability of funds does not establish any obligation that 
the funds be allocated to any specific purpose, such as 
salary increases. 
l/Harborfields CSD. 5 PERB 1f3047 (1972). 
126 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 26, 1984 
— - -Aibahy^ New York 
T a ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<^U ^txog^-
Ida Klaus. Member 
C. Rand l e>s \Member . David C. Randies.^Member 
$J-X.tv» 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE. 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 1095. AFSCME. COUNCIL 66. 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
EUGENE F. PIGOTT. JR., ESQ. (MICHAEL A. CONNORS. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
MICHAEL A. TREMONT. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 1095, 
AFSCME. Council 66. AFL-CIO (AFSCME) to the decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge. The 
charge alleges that the County of Erie (County) both 
interfered with the protected rights of employees and refused 
to negotiate with AFSCME in January 1982 in that it 
transferred unit work to nonunit employees with the result 
that unit employees were laid off and overtime assignments 
were curtailed. 
The unit employees performed work for the Department of 
Youth Services in several different titles. The unit includes 
full-time employees, meaning those who work 40 hours a week, 
and regular part-timers, meaning those who work 20 to 39 hours 
a week. AFSCME complains that in January 1982. work that had 
#2D-6/26/84 
CASE NO. U - 5 8 6 6 
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previously been performed by the unit employees was assigned 
to occasional workers, meaning part-timers who work fewer 
than 20 hours a week. 
The record shows that the work had been performed by 
such occasional workers before January 1982. and that their 
terms and conditions of employment had not been addressed in 
the parties1 collective bargaining agreements. Based upon 
this history of the employment of occasional workers to 
perform the same work as the unit employees who work 20 or 
more hours a week prior to January 1982. the ALJ determined 
that the assignments involved had not been the exclusive work 
of the employees who constituted AFSCME's unit. Relying upon 
our decision in Guilderland CSD. 16 PERB 1[3038 (1983). and 
several earlier decisions, he ruled that the impact of the 
new work assignments upon full-time and regular part-time 
employees notwithstanding, there had been no showing of a 
Taylor Law violation. 
AFSCME argues that the ALJ erred in determining that the 
assignments in question had not been unit work exclusively 
before January 1982. In support of this argument, it points 
to evidence in the record that before January 1982. 90% of 
the occasional workers had also held positions as full-timers 
or regular part-timers. It notes that this preponderance of 
unit employees performing the occasional assignments did not 
continue after January 1982. This, according to AFSCME. 
Q19Q 
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demonstrates that the work of these occasional part-timers 
had been unit work until the County acted unilaterally to 
assign it to persons other than full-timers and regular 
part-timers. AFSCME further asserts that the role and 
function ofoccasional workers was changed in that prior to 
January 1982, they were hired to relieve temporary staff 
shortages while thereafter they were expected to perform 
„ 1/ ongoing assignments.— 
Reviewing the record, we affirm the decision of the ALJ 
that the County did not assign work that had been exclusively 
that of full-timers and regular part-timers to other 
persons. While most, but not all, of the occasional workers 
employed before January 1982 had also held positions as 
full-timers or regular part-timers, we find that they were 
not working in that capacity when they performed as 
occasional workers. We also find that both before as well as 
after January 1982. occasional workers were employed to 
perform ongoing assignments paralleling those of full-timers 
and regular part-timers as well as to relieve temporary staff 
shortages among the full-timers and regular part-timers. 
i/AFSCME also argues that the County refused to 
negotiate the change or its impact. The charge, however, 
makes no such complaints. It merely complains about the 
County's unilateral action. 
130 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 26, 1984 
—- — iflrbaiiyT—New —York-
thc~*J>£.AL VPM?~H^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
/O^U^a 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s . \Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #3A-6/26/84 
TOWN OF ALMOND, 
Employer, 
_ :^ aild= ^__^ , ^CASE NO^g-2^63 
CHAUFFEURS. TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
& HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 65, IBT, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 65, IBT has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All town maintenance employees of 
the Town of Almond. 
Excluded: Maintenance Superintendent. 
- 9132 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 65, IBT and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit 
found appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such 
employee organization in the determination of. and administration 
of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: June 26, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
<1&0^fZ2^ 
2U w* 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
